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NOTES AND COMMENT
damaging) was admitted in evidence against him. The Court believed
it "clear that the seizure of the ledger and bills, in the case now under
consideration, was not authorized by the warrant." 32 However the
conviction was sustained, for when the officers arrested the co-defendants,
they had the right without a warrant to search the place, a right which
"extended to all parts of the premises used for the unlawful purpose." 33
In Ganbino v. United States," the defendants' automobile was
stopped by state police and searched without a warrant. Liquor was
found. The prisoners and liquor were immediately delivered to federal
authorities. At the time, the state prohibition law had been repealed.
Defendants' motion to supress the liquor as evidence was denied, and it
was later introduced at the trial. The Court, in reversing the conviction,
determined that the state officers had acted without probable cause and
in the erroneous belief that it was their duty to enforce the National
Prohibition Act. While they were not, at the time, "agents of the United
States," still "the wrongful arrest, search, and seizure were made solely
on behalf of the United States." The "protection bf the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments" (restrictions upon federal action) was here ex-
tended to embrace state action "on behalf of the United States." 35 If
there must be a rule of exclusion it is only proper that it be logically
applied.36
In conclusion, it might be observed that but fourteen of the forty-six
states in which the question has arisen, have subscribed to the federal
rule.87 The argument that-exclusion is the only feasible means of
enforcing the Fourth Amendment" has been generally rejected in the
interests of the greater social need that crime go not unpunished.
V. J. K.
FURTHER LIMITATION OF MOTORCAR OWNERS' STATUTORY LIA-
BiuiTv.-It is interesting to observe that revolutionary extensions of
32 48 Sup. Ct. 74, 76.
33 Ibid. 77.
34 Supra note 2.
35 48 Sup. Ct. 137, 138.
36 In Byars v. U. S., 273 U. S. 28 (1927), the Court had said, following its
previous decisions, "We do not question the right of the federal government
to avail itself of evidence improperly seized by state officers operating entirely
upon their own account."
37 See in this connection an editorial, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 1, 1927.
38 See Atldnson, supra note 4, at page 26, exclusion is "warranted as the
only practical method of giving force to the letter of the Fourth Amendment."
Self-help and proceedings against the offender were considered ineffectual.
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common law liability accomplished through statutory enactment at times
become palpably restricted by refinement of exception or by severity of
modification of subsequent judicial opinion. Section 282-e of the High-
way Law 1 presents a striking illustration of this observation. Prior
to the enactment of this statute it was the law that an owner was not
liable for the negligence of a person to whom he had loaned his car, be
that person a member of his family, a servant on a personal errand, or
a stranger.2 In other words the party injured must seek his redress against
him whose actual negligence caused the injury..
By the introduction of this new Section,4 the owner's liability was
extended s6 as to charge him with responsibility for the negligence of
a person to whom he loaned his car, in the course of its operation upon
the highway. In this connection such lendee became the owner's agent.5
The rule, however, was soon circumscribed to the extent that where the
owner of a car loans the same to another, who in turn gives it over to a
third party without the consent of the owner, and while thus under the
control of such third party an accident results, the owner is not liable
if the original lendee was not present with the third party at the time
of the accident.8
1"Every owner of a motor vehicle operated upon a public highway shall
be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property result-
ing from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle in the business
of such owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or operating the
same, with the permission, expressed or implied, of such owner. *** " Laws
of 1924, Chap. 534; as amended by Laws of 1926, Chap. 730.
2Potts v. Pardee, 220 N.Y. 431, 116 N'.2E. 78 (1917) ; Van Blaricum V. Dodg-
son, 220 N. Y. 111, 115 N. E. 443 (1917) ; Fallon v. Swackhammer, 226 N.Y.
444, 123 N.E. 737 (1919).
3King v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 66 N. Y. 181, 184 (1876). There is an
exception to this rule in master and servant cases on the theory that the
servant is deemed to act for his master and insofar as he obeys his orders
he represents him. Engel v. Eureka Club, 137 N. Y. 100, 32 N. E. 1052 (1893).
4Supra note 1.
5Fluegel v. Coudert, 224 N. Y. 393, 155 N. E. 633 (1927).
0Owen v. Gruntz, 216 App. Div. 19, 214 N. Y. Supp. 543 (1926). Where
the lendee remains in control of the car, though permitting another to actually
drive the same, the onus of responsibility is the owner's, Stapelton v. Hertz
Drivurself Stations, 131 Misc. 52. 225 N. Y. Supp. 661 (1927) ; Feitelberg v.
Matuson, 124 Misc. 595, 208 N. Y. Supp. 786 (1925); Grant v. Knepper, 245
N. Y. 158, 156 N. E. 650 (1927) ; since the lendee or appointed chauffeur of
the owner was, to use the words of Judge Cardozo "still the director of the
enterprise, still the custodian of the instrumentality confided to his keeping,
still the master of the ship." Grant v. Knepper, supra, at 165. 'The fact
that the act of the substituted driver was sudden and unexpected will not
alter the rule.
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The recent case of Psota v. Andrews,7 evinces a further restriction
of Section 282-e. The action in question was one for personal injuries
arising out of an automobile accident at St. James, Long Island. Nash,
the chauffeur of the defendant, Mrs. Andrews, while driving defendant's
car invited Rosalie and George Psota for a ride. Shortly thereafter
the car was struck by a train of the Long Island Railroad, Nash was
killed and the two children sustained injuries. They and their father
now bring suit against the railroad company and Mrs. Andrews. The
jury exonerated the railroad and found three verdicts in varying amounts
against Mrs. Andrews. In the course of the trial, counsel for the
defendant Andrews attempted to show that at the time of the accident,
Nash was not using the car with her consent, expressed or implied, and
was not engaged in operating the car in the course of his employment;
furthermore, that his invitation to the Psota children to ride was in
violation of and contrary to, her expressed instructions to him. Such
testimony on the part of the defense was excluded by the trial judge to
the exception of the defendant.
On appeal by the defendant to the Appellate Division of the Second
Department, the decision of the Trial Court was unanimously affirmed,"
but leave was given to appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was
held that the decision of the Court below must be reversed and a new
trial granted. Crane, J., writing for a unanimous Court found that it
was reversible error for the trial judge to rule out the foregoing testi-
mony since Section 282-e" applied only in the event that the chauffeur,
Nash, was operating the car with the permission of Mrs. Andrews, and
in the course of his employment. In this regard the Highway Lav has
not changed the rule of common law to the extent that under the new
provision a master is liable for the acts of his servants or agents com-
mitted without their authority.'0 The rule has always been that a
chauffeur of an automobile must drive the same according to his instruc-
tions, expressed or implied."1 Therefore, even though Nash was driving
the car with the permission, expressed or implied, of Mrs. Andrews, he
was not acting within the scope of his employment if he invited these
children to ride contrary to her instructions.
7246 N. Y. 388, 159 N.E. 580 (Nov, 22, 1927).
8219 App. Div. 836, 220 N. Y. Supp. 912 (1927).
"Supra note 1.
1oRolf v. tHewitt, 227 N. Y. 486, 125 N.E. 804 (1920); Goldberg v. Bor-
-dens Condensed Milk Co., 227 N. Y. 465, 125 N.E. 807 (1920).
"Cunningham v. Castle, 127 App. Div. 580, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1057 (1908);
Stewart v. Baruch, 103 App. Div. 577, 93 N. Y. Supp. 161 (1905); O'Brien
v Stern Brothers, 223 N. Y. 290, 119 N.E. 550 (1918).
12213 App. Div. 517, 210 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1925). See also Roche v. N. Y.
Central R. Co., 221 App. Div. 497, 224 N. Y. Supp. 656 (1927).
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The holding in the instant case, renders obsolete the rule asserted in
Plaumbo v. Ryan' 2 where a similar question was raised. There it was
ordained that an owner is liable if a third person was using his auto-
mobile with his consent and it will not avail the owner to contend that
at the time and place of the accident his car was operated without the
pale of his authority and not on his business. It was asserted, moreover,
that the Highway Law abrogated the doctrine of Rolf v. Hewitt ' 3 and
made the owners of automobiles 14 liable for the negligence of any
person operating a car with permission of the owner, whether such auto-
mobile was being used in the business of the owner or otherwise.
The Court in the Psota case,', on the other hand, maintained that
the Legislature in modifying the previous law did no more than place
the borrower and lender of a car in a relationship analogous to that
of master and servant, principal and agent-but did not increase the
liability of the lender beyond that of the master for the acts of his
servant coming within the scope of employment.'8
It has been held that the section under consideration is so extensive
as to apply to persons riding within the car and not merely restricted
to the protection of travelers on the highway.1 7 Under such a situation,
however, care should be taken to distinguish cases where the owner of
the car expressly forbade his chauffeur or lendee from inviting people
to ride and those cases where expressed permission so to invite was
given. In the former class the owner is held to be not liable for injuries
sustained by the invitee by reason of the negligent operation of the car
by the chauffeur or lendee.' 8 In the latter class the owner is deemed to
be liable since the negligence of the chauffeur or lendee is, in effect, that
of the master.19
What the disposition of the Court would be in situations where it
appeared that the owner's assent was given to take the car for the
business of the borrower, but no intimation was given respecting the
presence in the car of an invitee of the borrower, is the question still to
be determined. The assumption is that even in such a case, the owner
would be liable to the invitee of the borrower on the theory that implied
authority was vested in the borrower to invite others to ride.
Further reflections on the principal case convinces one of its
28Supra note 10.
4 After July 1, 1924.
'
5 Supra note 7.
16Ibid 246.
'
7 Cohen v. Neustadter, 247 N. Y. 207 (Jan. 1928).
'sPsota case, supra note 7.
19 Cohen case, supra note 17.
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apparent soundness. Such an impression is strengthened by .what has
been hitherto determined to be the law, that -the Legislature may not be
presumed to have made any innovation ipon the common law further
than is required by the mischief to be remedied.2 0 The purpose of the
Highway Law was to cure the remediless plight of a highway traveler
injured by a motor vehicle, other than the one in which he might be
traveling, through the recklessness of an irresponsible driver to whom
the owner had entrusted the vehicle and thereby made the accident
possible.21 But in according this protection, it ddes not follow that the
common law rule of master and servant must be abrogated. The prin-
ciple was already put in jeopardy by earlier judicial interpretation of the
section. 22 There was set in it an entering wedge that might have been
the beginning of its destruction. The Psola decision was imperative if
the rule was to be preserved.
V. J. M.
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE CITY COURT OF THE CITY OF
Nnw YORK.-The new city court act for the city of New York I recently
has been the subject of judicial construction in the appellate term of the
supreme court, first department.2 The immediate point involved was the
validity of section 27 pi'oviding for the execution of the court's process
and mandates in any part of the state.3 Service of a summons was made
upon the defendant in the city of Albany where he resided and had his
place of business. A motion was made to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the said court had no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant and that it had no power to serve its process beyond the city
limits. Respondent contended that the provision that the city court
should have original jurisdiction concurrent with the supreme court in
the class of actions enumerated 4 empowered the city court to issue its
process throughout the State. Held, Section 27 of the act was uncon-
stitutional so far as it authorized the service of mandates indiscrimi-
nately in every part of the State because it -transcended the jurisdiction
"
0De~n .. Metropolitan R. Co., 119 N. Y. 540, 547; 23 N.E. 1054 (1890).
-'Spra note 17, at p. 210.
2 Sopra note 12.
)N. Y. Laws 1926, ch.. 539, enacted under authority of constitutional
amendment (art. 6, sec. 15) approved by the people at the general election
held Nov. 3rd, 1925. in effect Jan. 1st. 1926.
-American II istorical Society Inc. v. Glenn, 131 Misc. 291 (1928).
3N. Y. City Court Act §27, provides that "all process and mandates of
the court may be executed in any part of the State."
4Ibid. §16.
